Withholding belief v. denying knowledge - Page 9

pseudonous · 05-04-2008, 12:22 PM

Remster

"Sufficient evidence for what?"

To justify the belief, of course.

Pseudonous

Remster · 05-04-2008, 12:38 PM

Pseudonous

Quote:

"Sufficient evidence for what?"

To justify the belief, of course.

And do you hold anything like the view that of two beliefs that fit the same evidence, the simpler of the two is more likely to be true?

Remster

Remster · 05-04-2008, 12:42 PM

Rom

Quote:

Originally Posted by Remster

Are there any propositions that you thought at one time were self-evident truths but turned out to be falsehoods?

Rem .... possibly (Santa Claus?) .... not that I can recall or that jump out.

How about the proposition that nothing can be in two places at once? (I actually still believe this proposition, but that's another matter.)

Rem

romansh · 05-04-2008, 12:52 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Remster

How about the proposition that nothing can be in two places at once? (I actually still believe this proposition, but that's another matter.)

Rem ... I suppose this would depend on how I badly I could interpret quantum mechanics and relativity? I have hard time envisaging anything being in the same time and place but for the most fleeting of moments ... so being in two? .... Rom

pseudonous · 05-04-2008, 01:00 PM

Remster

Quote:

And do you hold anything like the view that of two beliefs that fit the same evidence, the simpler of the two is more likely to be true?

Yes, that would be true of some axiomatic arguements.

Pseudonous

Remster · 05-04-2008, 01:00 PM

Rom

I think my point (if I have one!) is that self-evidence isn't a reliable source of information. Consider, for example, someone who says it's self-evident to him that God exists.

On the question of whether you can fail to believe truly that you are (or that you aren't) in pain, I have to admit that I struggle to understand how you can fail. But sure enough, there are those who think it's possible.

Rem

Remster · 05-04-2008, 01:03 PM

Pseudonous

And what evidence have you to support that belief, viz. the belief that of two beliefs that fit the same evidence, the simpler of the two is more likely to be true?

The point I'm driving at here is the same point as I was driving at with Romansh: that we all have some unevidenced beliefs.

Remster

romansh · 05-04-2008, 01:23 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Remster

I think my point (if I have one!) is that self-evidence isn't a reliable source of information. Consider, for example, someone who says it's self-evident to him that God exists.

On the question of whether you can fail to believe truly that you are (or that you aren't) in pain, I have to admit that I struggle to understand how you can fail. But sure enough, there are those who think it's possible.

Regarding pain .... I know what you mean ... I am told some Buddhists are good with dealing with what apparently is the illusion of pain. Similarly I gather some amputees can still feel (including pain from) the missing limb.

For example I have mild tinnitus .... It's only there when I concentrate on it.

regarding self evident truth ... I agree ... but can lead to some amazing stuff.

pseudonous · 05-04-2008, 01:45 PM

Remster

Quote:

And what evidence have you to support that belief, viz. the belief that of two beliefs that fit the same evidence, the simpler of the two is more likely to be true?

OK, here is an generalized example of when it would be true that the simpler belief is more likely to be true. Consider to axiomatic arguements, one with two axioms A and B and another with three axioms A, B and C. The probability the axioms are true is unknown. So we say that the probability of A is 1/x, the probablity of B is 1/y and the probability of C is 1/z. Furthermore, lets say that for the conclusion to be true the axioms the arguemment is based on must also be true. In this case, the probability that the arguement based on two axioms is true is 1/xy and the probability that the arguement based on three axioms is true is 1/xyz. Since 1/xy > 1/xyz, it follows that the arguement based on less assumptions is more likely to be true.

Quote:

The point I'm driving at here is the same point as I was driving at with Romansh: that we all have some unevidenced beliefs.

That is quite a claim. It sounds to me that you are denying the existance of skeptics. Not just extreme skeptics that deny everything but also skeptical people that merely require the appropriate justification to hold a belief.

romansh · 05-04-2008, 03:24 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by pseudonous

Remster

Quote:

And what evidence have you to support that belief, viz. the belief that of two beliefs that fit the same evidence, the simpler of the two is more likely to be true?

OK, here is an generalized example of when it would be true that the simpler belief is more likely to be true. Consider to axiomatic arguements, one with two axioms A and B and another with three axioms A, B and C. The probability the axioms are true is unknown. So we say that the probability of A is 1/x, the probablity of B is 1/y and the probability of C is 1/z. Furthermore, lets say that for the conclusion to be true the axioms the arguemment is based on must also be true. In this case, the probability that the arguement based on two axioms is true is 1/xy and the probability that the arguement based on three axioms is true is 1/xyz. Since 1/xy > 1/xyz, it follows that the arguement based on less assumptions is more likely to be true.

Quote:

The point I'm driving at here is the same point as I was driving at with Romansh: that we all have some unevidenced beliefs.

That is quite a claim. It sounds to me that you are denying the existance of skeptics. Not just extreme skeptics that deny everything but also skeptical people that merely require the appropriate justification to hold a belief.

Nous ... I like your end point but can't agree with how we got there.

Taking your two (three) axioms A B (C): should we not also include the probabilities of there being no other axioms say O(AB) and O(ABC)

The two probabilities become:

1/xyO(AB) and 1/xyzO(ABC)

So we are no further ahead ....