Remster

Nope.

pseudonous

Remster,

Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that you thought they were inconsistent. I obviously did very poorly at expressing my disagreement with your argument in my last post. From your response I can see that there is something I may be missing so I would like to go over your argument to illustrate how I view it. Perhaps, you could also give a line by line proof as I did with my argument so I can see how you analyze it.

It seems to me that you start of with the assumed premise "Let's say that what we know [believe usefully] about nature is that P." I have no problem with this and I think we both agree that we know something (P). However, at this time I would like to point out that since you're using the useful belief definition of knowledge, the claim to know that P implies that P is useful rather than that P is TRUE.

You then claim "It follows that it's inconsistent with what we know [believe usefully] that not-P." I also agree with this statement but to be sure we are defining our terms the same I would say that two propositions are consistent if there is any chance no matter how slight that they (the propositions) are both true (or in this case they are both useful). Anyway, just like both P and not-P can not both be true they also can not both be useful. Therefore, I agree that it follows that P and not-P are inconsistent.

It is your third sentence "But if it's epistemically possible that our belief that P isn't TRUE, then it's consistent with what we know [believe usefully] that not-P." that still gives me trouble. In your last post, you stated that the consequent follows from the antecedent by definition which makes me fairly confident that this is where are disagreement lies. Though it may be that I disagree with the conclusion that you draw from your premises rather than with this premise. I'll have to wait for your response to see if I am misinterpreting you. Anyway, back to my analysis.

If by 'not-P' you mean 'P isn't TRUE' then I agree that this conditional statement is true by definition. However, I would not see how you derive your conclusion because in your second sentence 'not-P' clearly means 'P isn't useful'. On the other hand, if by 'not-P' you mean 'P isn't useful' then I disagree that this follows by definition.

I don't really have anything to say about your conclusion "Therefore it isn't epistemically possible that our belief that P isn't TRUE." except to say that it seems that your overall argument suggest that anything we believe usefully must be TRUE (i.e. is not an epistemic possibility). Well, that or it does depend on the definition of knowledge. It seems to me to be an argument that was constructed from the point of view that knowledge is justified TRUE belief, given that if knowledge was jTb then I would readily agree that it is a sound argument.

I know my refutation of your third sentence was cursory but I hope I got my point of view across. Really, at this point, I'm just not sure if I understand your argument so I was predominantly trying to give my interpretation of it.

Just a few last definitions that might be relevant.

By true I mean 'it is the case'
By TRUE I mean 'it is really the case'
By *true* I mean 'it is useful'

I think these all fit the definition of true being 'P is true iff P' which I read P is true if and only if P is the case. So P is TRUE iff P is the really the case and P is *true* iff P is useful. True is just a generic idea whereas TRUE and *true* specify in what way we mean it to be the case.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

xris

I cant wait for the reply this is truely intriguing.

Remster

Man, he's like the chav kid you made the mistake of answering back to outside MacDonald's. I expect a knife in the guts at any moment.

xris

MacDonalds never eat their myself its dogs shipping and it makes you paranoid if you eat too much of it.

Remster

Pseudonous

I want to start with this:If you recall, I introduced the locutions 'TRUE' and '*true*' in a much earlier post so that we could easily distinguish between what you think people ordinarily mean by 'true' and what I think people normally mean by 'true'. You stated that what you think people ordinarily mean by 'true' is 'useful', and I stated what I think people ordinarily mean by 'It is true that P' is 'P' (there's no way of expressing my view without using a sample proposition). In view of this, I'm puzzled by your second definition above: 'By TRUE I mean "it is really the case"'. Why do you mean this by 'TRUE', when 'TRUE' was introduced expressly to capture what I think people ordinarily mean by 'true'?

To my argument. There's no need for a line-by-line proof (unless you really want one) as we agree about everything but this:Before I respond to this, I need to make a quick digression.

In philosophical writing, 'P' is sometimes used as a placeholder for a proposition and sometimes as a name for a proposition. When it's used a placeholder for a proposition, it plays the grammatical role of a clause, and you can create a meaningful sentence only by substituting a proposition without quotation marks for 'P', for example:

It is true that P.
It is true that the world is round if and only if the world is round.
If the world is round, then grass is green.

But when it's used as a name for a proposition, it plays the grammatical role of a proper noun, and you can create a meaningful sentence only by substituting a proposition within quotation marks for 'P', for example:

P is true.
'The world is round' is true if and only the world is round.
'The world is round' implies 'Grass is green'.

I hope you can see that I've used 'P' as a placeholder throughout my argument, but in the above paragraph you've used it as a name. Therefore for your paragraph to address my argument, it will need to be rewritten as follows:

If by 'not-P' you mean 'It isn't TRUE that P' then I agree that this conditional statement is true by definition. However, I would not see how you derive your conclusion because in your second sentence 'not-P' clearly means 'It isn't useful [to believe] that P'. On the other hand, if by 'not-P' you mean 'It isn't useful [to believe] that P' then I disagree that this follows by definition.

Are you happy with this? If not, will you rewrite your paragraph for me using 'P' as placeholder rather than a name (so it addresses my argument)? I'll hold fire until you've responded.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

Yes, I recall. I mean this because this is how I thought you meant it. I also recall one of us stating that if something was TRUE it was actually the case. Perhaps I recall incorrectly. In any event, after think about how you stated the deflationary definition of true as P is TRUE iff P, I was uncertain if we were both meant the same thing by TRUE. I am not familiar with the deflationary definition of true but the idea that P is true iff P is something with which I am familiar. When you say something is TRUE do you not mean that it is the case in reality? If not then I will certainly have to reevaluate your argument.

This is an interesting point on grammar but what is the difference in meaning between 'P is true' and 'It is true that P' (Assuming we are not discussing whether it is the letter P that is true or the meaning behind it that is true)?

I really don't see why I would object to this but sometimes I'm a bit slow.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

xris

To p or not to P that is the question whether it is true to P or not true to p and by peing we suffer the peing that we are brave enough to p. By our own P we will endevour to P, that maybe TRUE.Fair the well sweetpea.

Remster

Pseudonous

It's less a question of meaning than a question of clarity. Mix your uses of 'P' if you wish, but don't be surprised if you end up misrepresenting me or I end up misunderstanding you (even more).

What I mean is determined by what the 'something' is. If the 'something' is the proposition that the world is flat in reality, then when I say that it's TRUE that the world is flat in reality, what I mean is that the world is flat in reality. If the 'something' is the proposition that it's useful to believe that the world is flat, then when I say that it's TRUE that it's useful to believe that the world is flat, what I mean is that it's useful to believe that the world is flat. And if the 'something' is the proposition that the world is flat in all epistemically possible worlds, then when I say that it's TRUE that the world is flat in all epistemically possible worlds, what I mean is that the world is flat in all epistemically possible worlds. I hope you can see from this that whether or not 'It's TRUE that P' is about what's-the-case-in-reality is determined by the content of 'P' and not by the meaning of 'TRUE' (I can't overstate the importance of this).

I'm bemused. First, by 'Not-P' I can't mean 'It isn't TRUE that P', because I'm treating 'Not-P' as basic: 'Not-P' is the analysans; 'It isn't TRUE that P' is the analysandum. What I mean by 'Not-P' will depend on what 'P' is, so if 'P' is 'It's raining', 'Not-P' will be 'It's not raining'. Secondly, in my second sentence, the only way that 'Not-P' can mean 'It isn't useful to believe that P' is if 'not' means 'it isn't useful to believe that', which would be very odd indeed ('It's raining' would mean 'It's raining', and 'It isn't raining' would mean 'It isn't useful to believe that it's raining'). Moreover, if 'Not-P' did mean 'It isn't useful to believe that P', the statement 'We believe usefully that not-P' would come out as 'We believe usefully that it isn't useful to believe that P'. Seriously?! I can understand the proposal that 'true' means 'useful', even if I disagree with it, but to introduce usefulness into the meanings of the bearers of truth (in this case the proposition 'Not-P') is a new turn entirely.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

Point taken.

[QUOTE...I hope you can see from this that whether or not 'It's TRUE that P' is about what's-the-case-in-reality is determined by the content of 'P' and not by the meaning of 'TRUE' (I can't overstate the importance of this).[/quote]

OK, I see that you would prefer to have every thing spelled out in the proposition. Myself I am use to looking at the subtext. For instance, your use of the word *true* to mean 'it is usefully the case' led me to believe you were trying to accomplish something similar with the word TRUE. Also, I previously used TRUE with the intention of referring to something which is the case in reality back on page 21 - "As for my own viewpoint, I would be more inclined to accept a justified true belief definition of knowledge if by true it was referring to something being true in an epistemically possible world rather than true in the actual world (TRUE)." Not that any of this matters other than to show where the misunderstanding comes from.

Well, I don't know what you mean by "I'm treating 'Not-P as basic:'. Whatever you mean by this is lost on me because from my point of view if it's not raining then it isn't true that it is raining. I kind of thought this followed from the definition of true being "P is true iff P".

Well, it seems to me that if your defining knowledge as useful belief then a claim to know P is a claim that it is useful to believe P. So if not-P is by definition inconsistent with this knowledge then not-P must be a claim that it isn't useful to believe P. There is no need to equate 'not' with 'it isn't useful to believe that'; It is explicitly stated in the definition of knowledge. From the rest of your paragraph it looks like you agree with this so it appears this is just more of a misunderstanding than a disagreement.

So it appears that most of our disagreement resulted from a confusion of terms more than anything else. If you don't think that knowledge (jtb) of nature that P necessarily implies that P is the case in reality then my argument is neither here nor there. And I take it that you would say something like 'I know about nature that P in reality.' if this is what you meant.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche