Remster

Pseudonous

I'm really sorry for taking so long to get back to you. I didn't receive my usual e-mail notification of your reply, and when I logged in and replied to Not Convinced, I didn't spot it. I saw it just now only because I'd logged in to find out if there was something wrong with the website. Anyway ...

I've agreed that when someone utters 'I believe with justification that P', we can infer that he thinks it's TRUE that P, and I've agreed that in this respect (though only in this respect) 'I believe with justification that P' and 'I know (jTb) that P' are pragmatically indistinguishable. No arguments there. But this is different from agreeing (which I don't) that when someone utters 'I know that P' his claim – what he asserts – is simply that he believes with justification that P, or that this is what 'effectively we understand his claim to be'. On the contrary, I think that his claim that he knows that P (unlike his claim that he believes with justification that P) is such that it will be always FALSE if it's not TRUE that P, and I think that this is how people regard the knowledge claims of almost anyone in everyday life.

You didn't say it: it was the only way to make sense of your argument. It's gone like this (to paraphrase):

Pseudonous: We can't know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims.
Remster: How have you come to this conclusion?
Pseudonous: When we try to explain nature we are working off of a partial understanding; we can always learn more which will show whatever conclusions we have previously reached to be weak.
Remster: But how do you get from this (which I agree with) to your conclusion (which I don't agree with, at least not on these grounds) that we can't know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims?
Pseudonous: Inductive arguments are not truth preserving.

So what does the fact that inductive arguments are not truth preserving have to do with your conclusion that we can't know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims? Please spell it out!

When I said 'There's no need for a truth-preserving mode of inference here, unless justification requires infallibility', I meant that there's no need for a truth-preserving mode of inference here, unless for a belief to be justified it must be such that it couldn't (logically) have been false given the evidence on which it's based. So my belief that I'm experiencing redness is infallible where the evidence is my experiencing redness, because belief and evidence are one and the same, whereas my belief that I'm seeing a tomato is fallible where the evidence is my experiencing redness, because I might have been seeing an apple (for example).

Sorry, are you now saying that statements about nature are themselves possible worlds (this follows from your two sentences)? Previously you were saying that statements about nature were statements about possible worlds.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

No problem. We've been at this discussion for quite sometime and it was nice to have a bit of a break. Good to hear from you again though.

Then we agree here.

This is where we disagree.

I suppose I don't really disagree. This is a distinction between a claim to know (jTb) and a claim of justified belief. However, this is a logical distinction, an abstract distinction and not a pragmatic (practical) distinction. The reason I say this is not a pragmatic distinction is that we do not know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims pertaining to the universe.

Our knowledge claims (about the universe) are reached using inductive arguments.

No. I am still just saying that statements about nature are statements about possible worlds. I really don't see how you interpreted my two sentences to mean that statements are possible worlds. That idea doesn't even make sense to me.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Setting aside until the next paragraph the question of whether your premiss is true, perhaps you can help me out with a little recap. What's the practical distinction that you think exists in ordinary usage between the utterances 'I believe with justification that P' and 'I know that P', which you think the jTb analysis fails to honour? I'm asking for just a reminder of the practical distinction here and not an elaboration of how the jTb analysis falls short.

Yeeeees. But what do the facts that a) inductive arguments aren't truth preserving and b) our knowledge claims about the universe are reached using inductive arguments have to do with your conclusion that c) we can't know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims about the universe? For the conclusion to follow from the premisses, you must also assume that we can know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims only if they're reached using truth-preserving arguments; but you've already berated me for suggesting this ('I don't recall ever saying that knowing that we know requires a truth-preserving mode of inference').

It doesn't make sense to me either, but I'm afraid it's what you said:

' … statements people make about the actual universe/nature [A] are nothing more than their conceptions of the actual universe/nature [b]. Their conception of the actual universe/nature [b] is just a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe [C] … .'

A = B [your first sentence]
B = C [your second sentence]
Therefore A = C [my inference]

If we can't agree on a simple argument form like this, we're in big trouble!

Then you're just repeating your claim without clarifying it. I suspect what you're trying to say is that when someone utters, for example, 'Grass is green', this is shorthand for 'Grass is green in at least one epistemically possible world' and not shorthand for 'Grass is green in the actual world', and therefore what they've uttered can be true even if grass isn't green in the actual world. Is that right? (If not, I'll return to my previous point.)

Remster

Remster

Pseudonous

Setting aside until the next paragraph the question of whether your premiss is true, perhaps you can help me out with a little recap. What's the practical distinction that you think exists in ordinary usage between the utterances 'I believe with justification that P' and 'I know that P', which you think the jTb analysis fails to honour? I'm asking for just a reminder of the practical distinction here and not an elaboration of how the jTb analysis falls short.

Yeeeees. But what do the facts that a) inductive arguments aren't truth preserving and b) our knowledge claims about the universe are reached using inductive arguments have to do with your conclusion that c) we can't know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims about the universe? For the conclusion to follow from the premisses, you must also assume that we can know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims only if they're reached using truth-preserving arguments; but you've already berated me for suggesting this ('I don't recall ever saying that knowing that we know requires a truth-preserving mode of inference').

It doesn't make sense to me either, but I'm afraid it's what you said:

' … statements people make about the actual universe/nature [A] are nothing more than their conceptions of the actual universe/nature [b]. Their conception of the actual universe/nature [b] is just a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe [C] … .'

A = B [your first sentence]
B = C [your second sentence]
Therefore A = C [my inference]

If we can't agree on a simple argument form like this, we're in big trouble!

Then you're just repeating your claim without clarifying it. I suspect what you're trying to say is that when someone utters, for example, 'Grass is green', this is shorthand for 'Grass is green in at least one epistemically possible world' and not shorthand for 'Grass is green in the actual world', and that therefore what they've uttered can be true even if grass isn't green in the actual world. Is that right? (If not, I'll return to my previous point.)

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

It is not that I see a practical distinction between "I know that P" and "I believe with justification that P". Rather, it is that I see no practical distinction between "I know that P" and "I believe with justification that P".

What can I say, we're in big trouble. I admit I am not the best writer but in my defense your method of analysis does not work. Listing the components of my two sentences using A, B and C gives the following:

A = statements people make about the actual universe/nature
B = their conceptions of the actual universe/nature
B = Their conception of the actual universe/nature
D = a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe

Here we can see that B /= B. The difference being between the use of "conceptions" and the use of "conception". The distinction being one is a statement of their individual conceptions about the universe and the other is their overall conception of the universe.

I am speaking informally but I don't see that I've made any major claim that requires a formal logic proof. Frankly, I don't even know what you want me to prove.

Yes, I am repeating my claim. I thought that stating my claim in different words would help you understand what I am claiming.

I really hate to nitpick but in this case I feel I should point out that the statement "Grass is green." need not mean anything more than the color of grass is defined as green. As a statement about the actual world or an epistemically possible world it would need to be a little more specific. For instance, by "Grass is green" someone might mean "Any healthy plants having jointed stems, sheathing leaves and seed like grains absorbs all visible light except light with a wavelength of about 510 nm." This statement I would certainly say is a reference to an epistemically possible world. Perhaps you had some other interpretation of "Grass is green." in mind?

Reflecting on our discussion it seems the major difference between our two viewpoints follows from our approach to the problem of knowledge. Correct me if I am wrong but you start by defining knowledge as jTb. From here you leave open the possibility that we possess no TRUTHS and therefore may have no knowledge. I, on the other hand, accept that we do have knowledge. Like you I leave open the possibility that we have no TRUTHS and therefore knowledge does not necessarily require TRUTH. I just bring this up in the hope that this may show our fundamental differences and clarify where we are each coming from. I really do not know what kind of proofs you are expecting me to give or what claims you think I have made. To my mind any fundamental ideas (aside from the definition of knowledge) I have used are shared by both of us. Sometimes I think you may be reading more into what I say than what I intend. Certainly this may be my fault as my language skills are not the best. I would like to be clear that I do not propose to have a complete theory of knowledge. My idea of knowledge as a justified epistemically possible belief is more of a pet theory than anything. I do enjoy discussing it but again I do not mean to come off like I think it is the end all be all idea in epistemology.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Hang on, I thought your objection to the jTb analysis as an analysis of ordinary usage was that you'd found a distinction in ordinary usage – a practical distinction between 'I know that P' and 'I believe with justification that P' – that the jTb analysis failed to capture. Now you seem (in the above quotation) to be denying that this distinction exists in ordinary usage. Then why is it an objection to the jTb analysis that it also fails to capture it?

At this point, you've missed a whole section of my last post, which I'll repeat here:Sorry, I thought you were being casual with your singulars and plurals; you're still being a little unclear though. Rather than 'Statements people make about the actual universe/nature are nothing more than their conceptions of the actual universe/nature', did you mean 'Statements people make about the actual universe/nature are nothing more than statements of their conceptions of the actual universe/nature'? (I'm deriving this from 'One is a statement of their individual conceptions' from the passage quoted above.)

Interesting but kind of irrelevant, and I'm afraid I haven't the heart for point scoring. I'll rephrase. Are you trying to say that when someone utters 'P', this is shorthand for 'P in at least one epistemically possible world' and not shorthand for 'P in the actual world', so that what they've uttered can in principle be true even if not-P in the actual world?

Not quite. I too think it's important that an analysis of knowledge shouldn't have the consequence that we don't know anything, but I don't think the jTb analysis has that consequence. This is precisely what we're debating at the moment.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

[quote]Hang on, I thought your objection to the jTb analysis as an analysis of ordinary usage was that you'd found a distinction in ordinary usage – a practical distinction between 'I know that P' and 'I believe with justification that P' – that the jTb analysis failed to capture. Now you seem (in the above quotation) to be denying that this distinction exists in ordinary usage...QUOTE]

No, I have been trying to say all along that I make no practical distinction between someone making the claim "I know that P." and "I believe with justification that P."

I don't understand the question.

Yes

Yes, in the sense that this is just a restatement of the above quote.

Then to recap here:

We both believe we have some knowledge.
You believe possessing knowledge necessarily entails possessing TRUTH.
I don't believe possessing knowledge necessarily entails possessing TRUTH.

If this is the case then I have to ask - how do you know that we possess any TRUTHS?

Now that I see that we don't both agree that we may not possess any TRUTH about the natural world I can understand somewhat why you keep bringing this up. Let me restate this and perhaps it will make more sense to you.

When it comes to the claims we make about the natural world we use inductive reasoning. This inductive reasoning does not guarantee us that our conclusions will be TRUE. Therefore, our claims about the natural world may be FALSE.

Furthermore, if all our claims about the natural world may be FALSE and yet we do possess knowledge about the natural world then knowledge does not necessarily entail possession of TRUTH.

I see that this is not a complete proof. I also choose not to include TRUTH as a requirement for knowledge because I have been unable to find any statement I would make about the natural world that I can conclusively say is TRUE nor have I been able to manufacture a more indirect argument that might prove that I must know some TRUTH without specifying just what proposition about the natural world is TRUE.

Anytime in the past in which I thought I have done this I later found that I was always calling something TRUE because I defined it to be true or it was just an observation. Some examples would be:

1. Defining knowledge as a TRUE belief and stating that we possess knowledge and concluding I must know some TRUTH. (Pardon my lack of imagination to create a more original example.)
   
2. Claiming it is TRUE there are stars in the sky.

In the first example, it is only TRUE because I defined it to be TRUE. In the second example, it is only an observation. This would lead to knowledge and observables meaning the same thing. Furthermore, I am not sure I would admit that it is TRUE without clarifying what is meant by "star", "sky", etc... After doing that it would likely be reduced to something as banal as a description of an experience not unlike saying "I am experiencing redness." or become something I consider TRUE by definition or become a more complicated claim that I would have to admit may or may not be TRUE.

Hope that helps clear things up.

On a different note, I hope you don't think I was berating you. Sometimes the written word can come across differently than I intend. I'll admit I have found your questions a bit frustrating at times but for me this is certainly not about winning an argument or point scoring. Originally I just responded to this thread to answer your question about my position regarding a god as an agnostic. I can see how, given your question, this led to a discussion of beliefs and knowledge. I also find epistemology interesting and was curious if you could find some shortcoming in my position. I still don't see anything in what you have said to make me think differently but I am certainly not married to my ideas. Yet, I don't find your ideas or yourself as deserving of any kind of emotional criticism.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Well, I don't know how much experience you have of philosophical analysis, but the usual procedure for debunking a proposed analysis of an everyday concept is to show that the everyday concept has some feature that the proposed analysis doesn't have, or vice versa. With this in mind, I took your argument to be as follows:

1. With the everyday concept of knowledge, there's a practical distinction between 'I know that P' and 'I believe with justification that P'.
2. But on the jTb analysis of knowledge, there's no practical distinction between 'I know that P' and 'I believe with justification that P'.
3. Therefore the jTb analysis of knowledge is incorrect.

I shan't go into details as to why I thought this was your argument, as I'm more interested in moving forward than in recriminations. However, it would help me enormously if you were to state your argument in a step-by-step form as I've just done, to give me a clear view of it.

Right, next question. Rather than 'Their conception of the actual universe/nature is just a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe', did you mean 'Their conception of the actual universe/nature is just a conception of a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe'?

Let's tread carefully here. By 'possessing TRUTH' do you mean simply 'having a TRUE belief'?

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

First off I am not attempting to debunk the jTb analysis of knowledge rather I am attempting to explain why I do not accept it. Here is one reason I do not accept it given in a step by step form.

1. If knowledge of nature is a justified TRUE belief then either we have TRUE beliefs about nature or we have no knowledge of nature.
   
2. We do have knowledge of nature.
   
3. Possibly we do not have TRUE beliefs about nature.
   
4. Therefore, possibly knowledge of nature is not a justified TRUE belief.

Do you agree?

Yes.

Yes.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

That argument looks invalid to me. It has the same form as the following:

1. If bachelors are unmarried, then either I'm unmarried or I'm not a bachelor.
2. I'm a bachelor.
3. Possibly I'm not unmarried (i.e. possibly I'm married).
4. Therefore, possibly bachelors aren't unmarried (i.e. possibly bachelors are married).

All the premisses are true, but the conclusion is patently false. (Of course, if you're talking about epistemic necessity rather than logical necessity, there would be something conversationally odd about stating 'I'm a bachelor' followed by 'Possibly I'm married', but this issue is pragmatic and not logical.)

So to rejig your two sentences in the light of this clarification, we get:

'Statements people make about the actual universe/nature are nothing more than statements of their conceptions of the actual universe/nature. Their conception of the actual universe/nature is just a conception of a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe.'

Now, I didn't fully understand your 'individual conceptions'/'overall conception' distinction, as I wasn't sure whether by 'their individual conceptions' you meant to refer to each conception of each individual or the overall conception of each individual, and I wasn't sure whether by 'overall conception' you meant to refer to the overall conception of each individual or the overall conception of all individuals. But I'm not sure it matters in the present context, and I can't think of any objection that's relevant to it. Therefore, would you be happy to have your two sentences reduced to something like 'Statements people make about the actual universe/nature are statements of their conceptions of possible worlds'?

That's a relief. So to move on to the next stage of your last-but-one post:Well, if to possess a TRUTH is to have a TRUE belief, and if it's uncontentious that we have beliefs, and if the belief-that-P is TRUE if and only if P (this is the definition of 'TRUE'), then your question looks to me to be reducible to 'How do you know, for any proposition P, that P?' (if this requires further elaboration, please ask). Is that all you're trying to ask me? Or are you trying to ask something more like 'How can you be absolutey certain that we possess any TRUTHS?' or 'How can you rule out the possibility that we don't possess any TRUTHS?'

Remster