Remster

Pseudonous

I just want to start by mentioning that although I agree that 'I believe with justification that the world is round' and 'I know (jTb) that the world is round' are pragmatically the same in respect of what we can infer from their utterance about the thoughts of the speaker, there are other pragmatic respects in which they're different. For example, the bald assertion 'The world is round', and by extension 'I know (jTb) that the world is round', might be appropriate formulations in a didactic context, but in a dialectical context 'I believe with justification that the world is round' would be a more appropriate thing to say. I'm not attaching any great significance to this but just pointing out that the jTb analysis allows for these differences.

What does the pronoun 'it' refer to in your first sentence: Rutherford's belief that atoms are made up of discrete particles or his claim that he knows that atoms are made up of discrete particles? I'll return to your argument when you've given me this clarification.

All right, but how do you get from this to the conclusion that we don't know that we know? Perhaps you could give me a step-by-step (preferably numbered) argument. So far I've only a first premiss and a conclusion:

• When we try to explain nature we are working off of a partial understanding; we can always learn more which will show whatever conclusions we have previously reached to be weak.
• Therefore, we don't know that we know about nature.

Perhaps, for example, you think that knowing that we know about nature requires that our conclusions about nature be non-weak.

According to the definition of TRUTH that I've given, 'P' is TRUE if and only if P. There's no restriction to the actual world here. For example, 'Grass is blue in epistemically possible world W1' is TRUE if and only if grass is blue in epistemically possible world W1. So my question still stands: how do TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds relate to propositions about 'nature' and the 'universe'?

An example of an observation-statement might be 'I'm experiencing redness'. An example of a statement about the universe/nature might be 'Here is a tomato'. The second statement expresses a fallible hypothesis about the cause of the experience that the first statement describes.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

"What does the pronoun 'it' refer to in your first sentence:"

By "it" I am refering to the proposition that atoms are made up of discrete particles.

"All right, but how do you get from this to the conclusion that we don't know that we know?"

Inductive arguments are not truth preserving. I thought you already agreed with this. Have you changed your mind?

"So my question still stands: how do TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds relate to propositions about 'nature' and the 'universe'?"

I would say the propositions we make about the universe/nature are statements about epistemically possible worlds.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

NotConvinced

I'm just gonna jump in here, cuz I don't want to read the twenty some odd pages. The following is my take on topic:

I think the position of "withholding belief" is just silly, it's like a little school girl saying "I'm not gonna tell you!"

If I'm familiar with the definition of something (e.g. God), then it doesn't seem to matter how sure or unsure I am about whether they exist or not, I'm gonna believe one way or the other. I think when they break the brain down years from now, they'll discover something like a (for lack of a better term) binary system in place. I think it'll be something extremely complex indeed, but somewhat binary in nature.

One last question, are we in agreement that withholding belief is different from a lack of belief? Say Bob was born on a remote desert island where he never learned of what a God even is, he has a lack of belief, and is not withholding belief, right?

__________________
Everything you think you thought, the water's gone...every drop.

Remster

Not Convinced

I disagree that it's impossible to withhold belief, but your distinction between lacking belief and withholding belief looks like a useful one. By 'withholding belief' I meant simply 'lacking belief', but I'll use your phrase from now on.

Remster

Remster

Pseudonous

Right, I can return to your argument:
Your first sentence is correct: just because Rutherford claims to know that atoms are made up of discrete particles, we don't assume that atoms are made up of discrete particles. But this is because Rutherford's claim to know that atoms are made up of discrete particles might be FALSE, which is perfectly consistent with the jTb analysis of 'know'.

Your second and third sentences seem to be unconnected with your first, and I disagree with them. I claimed in my last post that there was a difference between the didactic contexts in which it's appropriate to say 'Atoms are made up of discrete particles' (and by extension 'We know that atoms are made up of discrete particles') and the dialectic contexts in which it's appropriate to say 'I believe with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles'. In other words, to utter 'We know that atoms are made up of discrete particles' is in part to assert that atoms are made up of discrete particles, whereas to utter 'We believe with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles' isn't. Perhaps this reflects another basic disagreement between us.

Absolutely not: I haven't changed my mind. But I still can't see how you're reaching your conclusion from your premiss (which is why I asked for a step-by-step argument). Why does knowing that we know require a truth-preserving mode of inference? Using the jTb analysis, I know that I know that P if and only if:

a) I believe with justification that I believe with justification that P,
b) I believe with justification that P, and
c) P.

There's no need for a truth-preserving mode of inference here, unless justification requires infallibility, which it doesn't. And on your useful belief analysis, I know that I know that P if and only if:

I believe usefully that I believe usefully that P.

There's no need for a truth-preserving mode of inference here either, unless to believe usefully that I believe usefully requires infallibility.

Sorry, how do TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds relate to statements about actual nature or the actual universe? Since not every epistemically possible world can be identical with the actual world, I take it there's a difference.

Remster

loophole

My chosen definition of knowledge is "acquaintance with facts." There are no facts pertaining to "God". Therefore, I do not believe or disbelieve in "God" because I lack knowledge relating to "God". I do not withhold a belief. That would mean that I have a belief but I choose not to tell anyone. However, you may have a different definition for knowledge. I choose to base my knowledge only on facts.

pseudonous

Remster,

I don't see how. All I said was that effectively we understand his claim to be that he believes with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles. Would you go further than to say that Rutherford's belief that atoms are made up of discreet particles may be false? Do you not think he really believed that atoms were made up of discreet particles? Or do you not think he had a justification for his belief?

I agree that there is a logical difference between "to know (jTb)" and "to have a justified belief". There is a logical relationship between the truth of the propostion "I know that X." and the proposition "X". Either both propositions are false or both are true. However, from a practical point of view stating either that you have a justified belief or knowledge (jTb) both imply that you think the associated proposition is true.

I don't recall ever saying that knowing what we know requires a truth-preserving mode of inference. Originally I said that my objection to jTb theory was that in practice we can not know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims. I was speaking about knowledge claims regarding the universe/nature. The knowledge claims use inductive reasoning which is not truth preserving. I really don't see what you are asking here as it seems like you agree with me.

If these three criteria must true for knowledge (jTb) and (c) may or may not be true, then it may or may not be true that you know that P.

Just to be sure I understand you by "infalliblitiy". You make a distinction between "that which can not be otherwise" and "that which could not have been otherwise". I am thinking that by "something that which can not be otherwise" you mean something which is actually true. Something which you call infallible is then "that which could not have been otherwise" and would therefore be something like a logical necessity (or perhaps just an epistemical necessity). If I am right in this then I am not refering to infallibility at all. I am saying that all propositions about the universe/nature are such that they can be otherwise.

Certainly there is a difference. Nonetheless, statements people make about the actual universe/nature are nothing more than their conceptions of the actual universe/nature. Their conception of the actual universe/nature is just a possible world that does not conflict with any observations they have made of the actual universe (i.e. it is an epistemic possibility).

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

NotConvinced

Good to see we're mostly on the same page, though I didn't say it was "impossible" to withold belief, I just said it was silly.

__________________
Everything you think you thought, the water's gone...every drop.

Remster

Not Convinced

You also said:
Weren't you appealing to causal necessity here?

Remster

NotConvinced

touché

__________________
Everything you think you thought, the water's gone...every drop.