Remster

Addendum: I probably should have thought of this yesterday, but I don't think I'd ever actually say my knowledge was fallible; rather, I'd say my justified belief was fallible. Still, if I were to say my knowledge was fallible, I'd mean what I said in the analysis above.

Remster

Addendum addendi: I've been a bit thick in my response to your paragraph starting 'Perhaps my biggest objection to jTb is that it seems to have no practical meaning'. Is what you were driving at that since everyone thinks his own beliefs are TRUE, someone who says 'I know (jTb) that the world is round' isn't telling us anything more about what he thinks than someone who says 'I believe with justification that the world is round'? The implication between 'I believe with justification that the world is round' and 'It's TRUE that the world is round' would be pragmatic rather than logical. See this link:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conversational_implicature

pseudonous

Remster,

Yes, this is what I was driving at.

No, it does not tell us that it's TRUE that the world is round. If it is TRUE that I know the world is round then it follows that it is TRUE that the world is round. In practice we do not know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

pseudonous

Remster,

But an epistemically possible world still relates in some way to the actual world.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Then you're right that in the context of 'I know (jTb) that the world is round', 'know' is pragmatically (though not logically) reducible to 'believe with justification'. But this is only one context: a first-person, present-tense one. Consider:

• Rutherford believes with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles.
• Rutherford knows that atoms are made up of discrete particles.

• I believed with justification that the mushroom was poisonous.
• I knew that the mushroom was poisonous.

On the jTb analysis, the first statement of each pair neither logically nor pragmatically implies anything about the TRUTH of the embedded proposition ('Atoms are made up of discrete particles'/'The mushroom was poisonous'), whereas the second statement of each pair logically implies that the embedded proposition is TRUE. So there's a difference after all between 'know (jTb)' and 'believe with justification'.

Well, the statement 'I know that the world is round' does tell us that it's TRUE that the world is round in the sense that it (the statement) entails the statement 'It's TRUE that the world is round'. But I take it that you're not denying this here. You seem to be saying that when someone utters 'I know that the world is round', we can infer that it's TRUE that the world is round only if we assume that what he utters is TRUE. Why is this an objection to the jTb analysis?

Again, why is this an objection to the jTb analysis (assuming it's true, which I'm not ready to concede yet)? Is your argument that we do in fact know that we know, so an analysis that implies that we don't know that we know must be wrong?

For sure. What way have you in mind?

Remster

mister_lister

This thread has become a pig of quotations and endless arguments. Argue till your blue in the face or convinced of your own position. It matters not to me. I simply don't and can't know if there is a god that I can understand. So far the religions of the world have propped up primative explanations which are constantly ratified.

I believe in Aslan, a fictional character from a book. Just like every other HOLY book, it is fiction. Imagination. Convince me that Aslan didn't save Edmund? Convince me the author of the Chronicles of Narnia was not peeking into another dimension, where animals talk.

****ing Ridiculous. YOU DON'T KNOW and Neither do I.

Get off the trail of the WHITE STAG and Endless arguments whether we should dream or live. Enjoy or cry about life on life's terms.

Take life on life's terms and stop quoting your holy books and each other to form a stupid mushroom cloud of toxic ash.

__________________
________________________________________________

"The trouble is not with what we don't know, it is with what we think we know that just ain't so". ~ Mark Twain

debdodd

good luck with that wish!

__________________
"Ubi dubium ibi libertas."

"We are all lone souls. It pays to know humility, lest the delusion of control, of mastery, overwhelms. And indeed, we seem a species prone to that delusion, again and ever again ....."

pseudonous

Remster,

I think I'm missing your point here. You start off by saying that 'know' is pragmatically reducible to 'believe with justification'. I agree with this. Then you mention that this is a first-person present-tense example and give other examples. At this point I am led to believe that you do not think that 'know' is pragmatically reducible to 'believe with justification' in these examples. However, it appears to me that 'know' is pragmatically reducible to 'believe with justification' in these other examples.

I do see your point that there is a logical difference between 'know (jTb)' and 'believe with justification'. Furthermore, I think this difference is present in all three of the examples you gave.

Yes, I am saying that when someone utters 'I know that the world is round', we can infer that it's TRUE that the world is round only if we assume that what he utters is TRUE.

It is an objection to the jTb analysis because in practice we do not know the TRUTH or FALSITY of knowledge claims and since everyone thinks his own beliefs are TRUE, someone who says 'I know (jTb) that the world is round' isn't telling us anything more about what he thinks than someone who says 'I believe with justification that the world is round'. Ultimately, this would seem to lead to substantial difference between the jTb theory of knowledge and our practical approach to knowledge claims in everyday life and in science.

I would like to add that this objection is not one that dismisses jTb as internally contradictory. Instead it is a reason why I think a better explanation is possible, and necessary for a successful epistemology. Again, I consider knowledge something that we possess even if we haven't properly defined it yet. I know we may disagree on this last point. Just to be thorough I would also like to add that I think it is possible we do not have any beliefs which are TRUE.

After typing all this up perhaps I can summarize my position as follows:

While jTb knowledge may be possible it is not necessarily so. As an interim solution (and possibly a permanent one) to the question of what knowledge is a more pragmatic definition should be explored. As things stand the difference between the practical use of knowledge and the jTb theory of knowledge leaves jTb theory firmly in the realm of speculative philosophy. Perhaps in the future, the jTb theory of knowledge can be elevated to a sound empirical position at which time I would be inclined to accept the jTb definition.

Not in the sense that I think if we know x then we should know that we know x. In fact, I wouldn't word my argument like this at all. I do think that we know that we know something but that is a close as I would like to get to saying an analysis that implies that we don't know that we know must be wrong.

My cursory idea is that our epistemically possible world model is related to the actual world through our 'observation statements' (to borrow your terminology). Also, our formation of 'observation statements' is based on our epistemically possible world model. Basically, we interpret our observations based on our world-view and our world-view is based on our interpretations of observations. I think we may use the word 'interpret' differently and 'world-view' is a bit vague so I would prefer to use some more specific terminology.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Let's look at them more closely then.

• Rutherford believes with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles.
• Rutherford knows that atoms are made up of discrete particles.

Imagine you're a scientist, an arch-rival of Rutherford, with access to the results of the latest research – research that hasn't been published yet but that atoms aren't after all made up of discrete particles. You might concede 'Rutherford believes with justification that atoms are made up of discrete particles'; but it wouldn't be appropriate for you to say 'Rutherford knows (jTb) that atoms are made up of discrete particles', because you no longer think it's TRUE that atoms are made up of discrete particles.

• I believed with justification that the mushroom was poisonous.
• I knew that the mushroom was poisonous.

Imagine someone serves me for dinner a mushroom that looks identical to a well-known poisonous variety, and on these grounds I refuse to eat it. Imagine further I'm told by the host after dinner that the mushroom wasn't poisonous, and I'm willing to accept his word. In this situation, I might excuse myself by saying 'I believed with justification that the mushroom was poisonous'; but it wouldn't be appropriate for me to say say 'I knew (jTb) that the mushroom was poisonous', because I no longer think it's TRUE that the mushroom was poisonous.

The important difference between these two cases and the first-person, present-tense case is that the speaker can appropriately say what he says without agreeing that the belief in question is TRUE.

Can you give me an example of 'our practical approach to knowledge claims in everyday life and in science' that illustrates the putative difference?

I'm easy on this point, particularly as you don't see it as alone supporting an objection to the jTb analysis, but can you tell me how you reached it?

But I'm asking you how TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds relate to propositions about 'nature' and the 'universe', which we seek to understand, and not how TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds relate to observation-statements. The preposition 'through' doesn't tell me a great deal.

Remster

pseudonous

Remster,

Your example of Rutherford claiming to know that atoms are made up of discreet particles is one. Just because he claims to know we usually do not assume it is TRUE. Effectively we understand his claim to be that he believes with justification that atoms are made up of discreet particles. This is also how people treat the knowledge claims of most anyone in everyday life.

It is important to point out that I was referring to knowledge claims about the nature and not mental constructs. I reached this conclusion because when we try to explain nature we are working off of a partial understanding. We can always learn more which will show whatever conclusions we have previously reached to be weak.

Your wording of "TRUE statements about epistemically possible worlds" seems odd to me. I was under the impression that by TRUTHS we were referring to what is true in the actual world (i.e. what is actually the case) not what is true in an epistemically possible world.

What distinction are you trying to draw between observation-statements and propositions about the universe/nature?

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche