Withholding belief v. denying knowledge - Page 16

Remster · 05-26-2008, 11:08 AM

Rom

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One of the thoughts that crossed my mind when I see a colour, say red, is it the same red, in my mind's eye, as when you see the colour red?

That's an old chestnut. I don't know any way to answer it either.

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When we experience a colour through illusion (Troxler fading / lilac chaser) do we believe we have seen it?

I suppose that would depend on how much we know about what's happening to us.

These are both interesting questions, but I'm not sure whether you're asking them because you think they have some bearing on the issue in hand.

Rem

pseudonous · 05-26-2008, 03:57 PM

Remster,

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Originally Posted by Remster

... I was going to object that 'scepticism' is mostly used for withholding belief (as in 'I'm sceptical about that') rather than denying knowledge, so that to call myself a 'sceptic' would be misleading...

Interesting, I looked at the definition of scepticism in my introductory philosophy book and it notes:

"...The skeptic can be advocating suspension of claims of knowledge or certainty, suspension of belief, or positive disbelief..."

In either case, whether a suspension of belief or knowledge claims, it seems that there is a suspension of thought. In other words, whether someone claims to believe something or claims to know something they are claiming to think something. I'm not sure this is relevant to our discussion, it's just something I thought worth mentioning.

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There is no one concept that's actually expressed by the word knowledge. The word knowledge has many uses … .

That's evading the point. Maybe the word 'knowledge' has many uses, but I'll still want to distinguish between uses that it already has and uses that it doesn't already have. I realise, for example, that there's knowledge-how as well as knowledge-that. But what there isn't, except in the practice of humpty-dumptying philosophers, is knowledge in the sense of 'justified useful belief'.

I assure you I am not trying to evade the point. I agree we should focus on meanings the word knowledge possesses in common use. I like the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.

I'm not so sure that the idea of knowledge as useful belief exists only in the practice of "humpty-dumptying" philosophers. For instance, if someone claims to know Chinese - Which by itself may be a claim to knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that - can I not claim to have knowledge that they know Chinese merely by seeing that they can effectively communicate with Chinese speakers? In this case, is it not the utility of the thing that gives me a sense of truth to the proposition that they speak Chinese? I am not trying to imply that this is the be all and end all answer to epistemic questions, just that it seems to have some merit.

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(I do sometimes wonder – though I've never explored this thoroughly – whether 'knowledge' is both ambiguous and vague in the same way as 'bald' is both ambiguous and vague...

I myself am leaning towards the idea that all words are meaningful but arbitrary. The study of fuzzy logic might be useful to gaining a deeper understanding of this idea. Hopefully, sometime in the near future I will be able to do this.

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In its strong sense, a belief doesn't amount to knowledge unless to have the belief entails that the belief is true (which is the position I've been adopting for the sake of this discussion – a position that leads to scepticism).

Yes, I think we agree on this point.

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In its weak sense, a belief can amount to knowledge even if it remains fallible, provided it's well evidenced and relates to the evidence in a particular way. However, the amount of evidence required and the precise way in which the belief must relate to the evidence are unclear and perhaps unspecifiable in a general way – which is why all attempted definitions seem to be susceptible to Gettier examples. Just a thought.)

When I think of epistemology I tend to focus on the weak sense of knowledge, since I view the strong sense as an open and shut case. At least for now, no knowledge of the world is possible with absolute certainty. Yet we still use the word knowledge when speaking about the world, so I find it very compelling to understand just what is meant by knowledge in these cases. It is in this sense that I think the pragmatic definition of truth has some merit in explaining what people mean by "I know".

I just looked up Gettier's examples on Wikipedia, it is very interesting. I'll have to spend some time seeing if Gettier's examples still pose a problem under the pragmatic definition of truth or even if Gettier examples are relevant to the question of knowledge in the weak sense of the term.

Pseudonous

romansh · 05-26-2008, 07:17 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Remster

Rom
These are both interesting questions, but I'm not sure whether you're asking them because you think they have some bearing on the issue in hand.
Rem

Rem
loosing track of the issue at had but was trying to answer your question....

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Can you describe a scenario in which someone believes he's experiencing redness (whether real or imaginary) but isn't?

Both are examples where I might see/experience redness in the absence of any 'red'.
Rom

Remster · 05-27-2008, 11:49 AM

Rom

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Both are examples where I might see/experience redness in the absence of any 'red'.

For sure, but that's not the issue. The issue is whether it's possible to believe you're experiencing redness – whether real or imaginary – when you're not (and not whether it's possible to experience redness when there's no red object in the vicinity).

Rem

Remster · 05-27-2008, 12:15 PM

Pseudonous

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In this case, is it not the utility of the thing that gives me a sense of truth to the proposition that they speak Chinese?

Sorry, the utility of what? The utility of the other person's communication skills or the utility of your belief that he can speak Chinese? (Incidentally, I wonder whether knowledge of a language is more akin to knowledge-of, i.e. acquaintance, than knowledge-that or knowledge how.)

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Yet we still use the word knowledge when speaking about the world ... .

And I suppose (he says grudgingly) that there may be two possible explanations for this: the first, which I favour, is that we thought we knew things that we didn't; the second, which you favour, is that we didn't mean what we thought we meant by 'knowledge'.

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I'll have to spend some time seeing ... if Gettier examples are relevant to the question of knowledge in the weak sense of the term.

It's not the weak sense of 'knowledge' that's threatened by Gettier examples. Rather, it's attempts to capture the weak sense in a precise definition. Any definition that lets in all the scientific and common-sense beliefs that we want to let in also lets in much more that we don't want to let in.

Remster

pseudonous · 05-27-2008, 06:07 PM

Remster,

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Sorry, the utility of what? The utility of the other person's communication skills or the utility of your belief that he can speak Chinese? (Incidentally, I wonder whether knowledge of a language is more akin to knowledge-of, i.e. acquaintance, than knowledge-that or knowledge how.)

The utility or effectiveness of the other person's communication skills. I was saying, would I not be justified in judging the truthfulness of a person's claim to know how to speak Chinese on whether or not they can use their knowledge of Chinese to speak to other people? If so, then this would be a case where what I mean by true has something to do with usefulness.

Pseudonous

romansh · 05-27-2008, 08:42 PM

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Originally Posted by Remster

For sure, but that's not the issue. The issue is whether it's possible to believe you're experiencing redness – whether real or imaginary – when you're not (and not whether it's possible to experience redness when there's no red object in the vicinity).

Rem
I'm not sure what are you after?
When I see something I can only believe that I see it (real or imaginary)?
Rom

Remster · 05-28-2008, 07:11 AM

Rom

Quote:

I'm not sure what are you after?
When I see something I can only believe that I see it (real or imaginary)?

No. I'm not asking if you agree with this statement:

Necessarily, if I'm seeing redness, then I believe that I'm seeing redness.

Rather, I'm asking if you agree with this statement:

Necessarily, if I believe that I'm seeing redness, then I'm seeing redness.

To falsify the second statement, you'd need to come up with a case where you believe that you're seeing redness (real or imaginary) but aren't.

Rem

Remster · 05-28-2008, 07:12 AM

Rom

Quote:

I'm not sure what are you after?
When I see something I can only believe that I see it (real or imaginary)?

No. I'm not asking if you agree with this statement:

Necessarily, if I'm seeing redness, then I believe that I'm seeing redness.

Rather, I'm asking if you agree with this statement:

Necessarily, if I believe that I'm seeing redness, then I'm seeing redness.

To falsify the second statement, you'd need to come up with a case where you believe that you're seeing redness (real or imaginary) but aren't.

Rem

Remster · 05-28-2008, 07:23 AM

Pseudonous

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I was saying, would I not be justified in judging the truthfulness of a person's claim to know how to speak Chinese on whether or not they can use their knowledge of Chinese to speak to other people?

But the usefulness is coming in at the wrong place, or there are too many layers of justification, judging/claiming and truthfulness in the above sentence for me to get to grips with it (your judgment is justified, the other person's claim is true, the other person's ability it useful). Please spell it out for me: which justified useful belief am I supposed to be considering here?

Remster