Remster

Rom

Hurrah. Now, when I used the phrase 'experiencing redness' a while ago, I was referring to what the following situations have in common in respect of how they seem to the person seeing (as opposed to the physics of the situations or how they really are):

• a white wall in red light seen through clear lenses
• a white wall in white light seen through red lenses
• a red wall in white light seen through clear lenses
• a hallucination of a white wall in red light seen through clear lenses/of a white wall in white light seen through red lenses/of a red wall in white light seen through clear lenses

Can you work with this usage of the phrase 'experiencing redness'? (Really, we're nearly there, and you've been very patient.)

Rem

pseudonous

Remster,

Good then we are roughly on the same page.

Just to let you know, I disagree with calling this position agnosticism. The position is certainly a form of scepticism though. Otherwise, there really is no disagreement between us here with the exception of the defining of knowledge but I'll address that below.

The point is to continue on with epistemology. If we define knowledge in such a way that knowledge is not possible then we are just ignoring the question.

Redefining knowledge is not a way to prove that knowledge is possible. We already know that it is possible. Consider that we can build cars and planes today when we use to not be able to do these things. There are many things that we have learned and this is another thing which a theory of knowledge is meant to adress. However we redefine knowledge we are not ignoring that it does not involve absolute certainty. In fact, the elimination of a claim to absolute certainty is put into the definition. So we have everything to gain when redefining knowledge and nothing to lose.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

romansh

Rem ... OK I think I could say experience redness in this case
In certain cirumstances I could also experience an illusion of redness
but carry on
... Rom

__________________
There is a theory which states that if ever anybody discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened. ........... Douglas Adams

Remster

Pseudonous

Why's that? Because you think the word 'agnosticism' by definition applies only to certain subject-matter (e.g. religion) or because you recognise only the 'withholding belief' sense of 'agnosticism' and not also the 'denying knowledge' sense?

I can't see what problem you envisage. We can still study the question of belief justification even if it becomes etymologically dubious to call our study 'epistemology' (on the grounds that we can't generally attain the extreme degree of justification required for episteme).

I'm still failing to appreciate the virtue of your approach. When I ask 'Is knowledge possible?', I'm asking whether it's possible for anything to satisfy the concept that's actually expressed by the word 'knowledge' in English; so I start by analysing that concept and then I try to work out whether it's possible for anything to satisfy it. By contrast, you seem to start with the answer you want ('Yes!') and then choose a concept that delivers that answer for you. But since the concept is different from the one expressed in the original question, you've answered a different question!

Remster

Remster

Rom

Okay, but that would still be a case of 'experiencing redness', right? Only the redness would be (as it were) imaginary redness of a real object, where in the case of hallucination it's imaginary redness of an imaginary object.

Rem

romansh

sorry did not mean to distract you .... carry on

__________________
There is a theory which states that if ever anybody discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened. ........... Douglas Adams

Remster

Rom

Okay, this allows me to return to the point at which I was talking about pain.

Some philosophers (fewer than in the first half of the last century) think that it's impossible to believe falsely that you're experiencing redness: that necessarily, if you believe that you're experiencing redness, you're experiencing redness. What are your thoughts on that? Can you describe a scenario in which someone believes he's experiencing redness (whether real or imaginary) but isn't?

Rem

romansh

One of the thoughts that crossed my mind when I see a colour, say red, is it the same red, in my mind's eye, as when you see the the colour red? I can see no easy experiment to confirm that our minds' eyes see the same colour.

Does this make sense?

When we experience a colour through illusion (Troxler fading / lilac chaser) do we believe we have seen it?

__________________
There is a theory which states that if ever anybody discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened. ........... Douglas Adams

pseudonous

Remster,

Neither but instead because the word 'scepticism' was already being used to refer to the position of denying knowledge before the word 'agnosticism' was coined. Furthermore, the term agnosticism was used to refer to the position of denying esoteric knowledge as a result of adhering to the principle that you should not believe a proposition without satisfactory evidence. These two philosophical positions have some overlap but are not identical.

True enough. We could even just find a nice Greek styled word that means "the study of justified beliefs" and create a new branch of philosophy. I think we are more or less in agreement and are really just differing in how we would prefer to use our words.

There is no one concept that's actually expressed by the word knowledge. The word knowledge has many uses such as that which is gained by learning, familiarity gained by experience, etc.... Studying these aspect of knowledge is just as much a part of epistemology as the question of absolute certainty. So, no I am not starting with the answer I want rather I want to fully explore all the questions of epistemology.

Consider ontology, the branch of philosophy which studies the nature of existence. If I was just to define existence as "to be part of the physical world" then I can conclude that the number 2 does not exist except as a symbol on a piece of paper. Would you then conclude I was only trying to get the answer I want if I were to suggest that the number 2 also exists as a concept?

This is the same thing I am doing when I point out the the word knowledge is used in many different ways. Epistemology, after all, is the theory of knowledge, an inquiry into its possibility, its nature and its structure. Epistemology is not merely the question of whether absolute knowledge is possible.

Pseudonous

__________________
"One is most dishonest to one's god: he is not allowed to sin." - Nietzsche

Remster

Pseudonous

Okay, I'll grant you that. I was going to object that 'scepticism' is mostly used for withholding belief (as in 'I'm sceptical about that') rather than denying knowledge, so that to call myself a 'sceptic' would be misleading. But of course 'agnosticism' is open to exactly the same objection – most people who call themselves 'agnostic' are indicating that they're non-committal on the question of God's existence and are not expressing an epistemic view.

That's evading the point. Maybe the word 'knowledge' has many uses, but I'll still want to distinguish between uses that it already has and uses that it doesn't already have. I realise, for example, that there's knowledge-how as well as knowledge-that. But what there isn't, except in the practice of humpty-dumptying philosophers, is knowledge in the sense of 'justified useful belief'.

(I do sometimes wonder – though I've never explored this thoroughly – whether 'knowledge' is both ambiguous and vague in the same way as 'bald' is both ambiguous and vague. 'Bald' is ambiguous in that it has a strong sense, where to be bald you must have no hair whatsoever, and a weak sense, where you can have a bit (even quite a lot) of hair and still be called 'bald'. In its weak sense it is also vague, in that the amount of hair you can have while being called 'bald' is unclear and perhaps unspecifiable in a general way. 'Knowledge' seems to share these features. In its strong sense, a belief doesn't amount to knowledge unless to have the belief entails that the belief is true (which is the position I've been adopting for the sake of this discussion – a position that leads to scepticism). In its weak sense, a belief can amount to knowledge even if it remains fallible, provided it's well evidenced and relates to the evidence in a particular way. However, the amount of evidence required and the precise way in which the belief must relate to the evidence are unclear and perhaps unspecifiable in a general way – which is why all attempted definitions seem to be susceptible to Gettier examples. Just a thought.)

Remster