Pseudonous
Everything in your last post is familiar and intelligible to me, so don't worry about having 'rambled on'. But it reminds me of the dictum (Nelson Goodman's?) that if you call chickens 'tables', it's easy to prove that tables lay eggs.
I'll get on to that in a minute, but first I want to comment on this:
Quote:
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If we do define truth as 'to be the case that' and truth was a necessary prerequisite of knowledge, then no knowledge of the natural world would be possible.
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Yes, and that's precisely my position – sometimes called 'agnosticism', sometimes called 'scepticism'. But if you recall where this thread started, my 'denying knowledge' doesn't entail my 'withholding belief', because I don't feel the need to align what I believe with what I know. This isn't to say I don't feel the need to
justify my beliefs; but justification comes in degrees, and it's just the extreme degree required for knowledge that I think we can't generally attain.
Now, back to chickens and tables. You elicit the proposal that we define 'true' as 'useful' to avoid the agnostic/sceptical conclusion. You also hint at an alternative, namely that we redefine 'knowledge' as 'justified
correct/
consistent belief'. Either of these options would enable us to say that we have knowledge of the natural world. But what's the point? When you say 'One way to avoid this problem is to use the pragmatic definition of truth', I imagine someone, struggling to prove that tables lay eggs, declaring 'One way to avoid this problem is to use the ornithological definition of tables'. You earn the right to use a certain form of words but at the cost of depriving them of the meaning that made their use interesting and contentious in the first place.
Remster
PS As discussed with Romansh, religious beliefs have their own sort of 'usefulness' too, of course.